Banks Muscle Up For Fight With States’ Attorney Generals!

Bank of America is loading up big guns for the coming battle over its mortgage practices. It has picked up former Virginia Attorney General Richard Cullen and Brian Boyle, formerly of the Justice Department.

From the Reuters article

Richard Cullen, chairman of the McGuireWoods law firm and Virginia attorney general from 1997-1998, is one of the lawyers representing the nation’s largest mortgage servicer. Cullen has already been communicating with the offices of various state attorneys general, according to a source familiar with the investigation.

Here’s more from further down in the same article –

Cullen served on President George W. Bush’s legal team during the Florida vote recount after the 2000 presidential election. He also represented Republican Tom DeLay in a recent federal probe that did not result in any charges being filed against the former U.S. House of Representatives majority leader.

Through a spokesman Cullen declined to comment on Bank of America. The company also did not answer questions on Wednesday.

Bank of America has also turned to a former top Justice Department lawyer in the George W. Bush administration to represent it in dealings with state attorneys general.

Brian Boyle, formerly principal deputy assistant U.S. attorney general, participated in a conference call between the bank and representatives from the Florida attorney general’s office, a spokeswoman for the office said.

It’s a pity that the Americans who were the victims of these practices will have to fight without picking up this kind of firepower.

But there is such a thing as justice and if these practices are as nefarious as they appear to me.

Justice will come.

James Pilant

The Definition Of Success Depends On Whether Or Not You Work For The Treasury Department

President Obama said the program would help three to four million people modify their mortgages. But through September, 728,686 struggling homeowners have been kicked out of the program; just 640,300 remain, the Treasury Department reported on Monday.

That doesn’t strike me as a success. If the intention was to keep people in their homes, it doesn’t seem to be working very well.

“The most specific of TARP’s Main Street goals, “preserving homeownership,” has so far fallen woefully short, with TARP’s portion of the Administration’s mortgage modification program yielding only 207,000 (out of a total of 467,000) ongoing permanent modifications since TARP’s inception, a number that stands in stark contrast to the 5.5 million homes receiving foreclosure filings and more than 1.7 million homes that have been lost to foreclosure since January 2009.”

That little quote is from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).  He has some more to say though –

“SIGTARP, along with the other TARP oversight bodies (GAO and the Congressional Oversight Panel), has long argued that Treasury should adopt meaningful benchmarks and goals for HAMP – permanent modifications that offer secure, sustainable relief to the program’s intended beneficiaries.  Remarkably, Treasury has steadfastly rejected these recommendations, and now finds itself defending a program that is failing to meet TARP’s goal of “perserving homeownership”.  As a result, a program that began with much promise must be counted among those that risk generating public anger and mistrust.”

But it gets better – at a meeting with administration officials for bloggers – Well, read the following –

On HAMP, officials were surprisingly candid. The program has gotten a lot of bad press in terms of its Kafka-esque qualification process and its limited success in generating mortgage modifications under which families become able and willing to pay their debt. Officials pointed out that what may have been an agonizing process for individuals was a useful palliative for the system as a whole. Even if most HAMP applicants ultimately default, the program prevented an outbreak of foreclosures exactly when the system could have handled it least. There were murmurs among the bloggers of “extend and pretend”, but I don’t think that’s quite right. This was extend-and-don’t-even-bother-to-pretend. The program was successful in the sense that it kept the patient alive until it had begun to heal. And the patient of this metaphor was not a struggling homeowner, but the financial system, a.k.a. the banks. Policymakers openly judged HAMP to be a qualified success because it helped banks muddle through what might have been a fatal shock. I believe these policymakers conflate, in full sincerity, incumbent financial institutions with “the system”, “the economy”, and “ordinary Americans”. Treasury officials are not cruel people. I’m sure they would have preferred if the program had worked out better for homeowners as well. But they have larger concerns, and from their perspective, HAMP has helped to address those.

You see, HAMP is designed to help the banks not the homeowners. It enabled the banks to manage their foreclosures during a period in which it would have been difficult to keep up the pace.

So, success is defined as making sure the banks are successful.

Gives you a warm feeling doesn’t it?

James Pilant

The Vast Majority Of Foreclosures Were Done Correctly?

We have been told over and over again during the last few weeks that the vast majority of foreclosures were done correctly. The White House and the various cabinet departments have echoed this claim.

This is all very odd. Since, the foreclosure documents were in hundreds of thousands of cases not even looked at, how would the banks or the Obama Administration know how many were done correctly?

They can’t. It’s impossible for them to have such knowledge.

Why would they say so? I suppose it’s a matter of faith, a belief that these huge institutions are run by competent, moral people. Faith is not a good substitute for factual data.

Well, new information is coming in. I have predicted that this kind of data would be coming in and here is the first.

From the New York Daily News –

Thousands of foreclosures across the city are in question because paperwork used to justify the seizure of homes is riddled with flaws, a Daily News probe has found.

Banks have suspended some 4,450 foreclosures in all five boroughs because of paperwork problems like missing and inaccurate documents, dubious signatures and banks trying to foreclose on mortgages they don’t even own.

So, 4,450 botched mortgage foreclosures have been found in five boroughs. That hardly squares with the idea that virtually all foreclosures were done correctly.

Here’s what one of the judges said, (again from the article) – Schack told The News he expects to see more paperwork snafus. “It’s like an onion we keep peeling,” he said. “It seems to be layers and layers of problems.”

Do you believe that the vast majority of foreclosures were done correctly?

I expect much more data to come out and it will not be to the foreclosure industry’s benefit. Nor will the Obama administration escape blame for its ridiculous unsupported claims about the crisis.

James Pilant

HAMP (Home Affordability Modification Program) Disastrous!

What a shock!

The Administration’s signature program to help homeowners is not working.

The banks get a 700 billion dollar bailout with no questions asked and the homeowner goes through mountains of paperwork and winds up getting nailed for late payments and fees they didn’t even incur!

From the article

The Obama administration’s signature anti-foreclosure effort, unveiled in 2009 with the promise of helping three to four million homeowners modify their mortgages, is such a failure that it now risks “generating public anger and mistrust,” according to a federal audit released Monday.

Far from helping at-risk homeowners, the Home Affordable Modification Program has actually made some homeowners worse off, according to the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program — also known as the Wall Street bailout. The Treasury Department set aside $50 billion from TARP, plus another $25 billion from taxpayer-owned Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to give mortgage servicers thousand-dollar incentives to reduce monthly mortgage payments by modifying eligible homeowners’ loans. But more people have been bounced from the program than have been helped by it.

People who apply for modifications via HAMP sometimes “end up unnecessarily depleting their dwindling savings in an ultimately futile effort to obtain the sustainable relief promised by the program guidelines,” the report notes, putting the imprimatur of the federal government on a claim long made by housing experts and homeowner advocates. “Others, who may have somehow found ways to continue to make their mortgage payments, have been drawn into failed trial modifications that have left them with more principal outstanding on their loans, less home equity (or a position further ‘underwater’), and worse credit scores.

“Perhaps worst of all,” it continues, “even in circumstances where they never missed a payment, they may face back payments, penalties, and even late fees that suddenly become due on their ‘modified’ mortgages and that they are unable to pay, thus resulting in the very loss of their homes that HAMP is meant to prevent.”

But don’t worry. The administration has a defense.

Treasury officials are adamant that not only is the program helping those homeowners who remain in it, but it also has helped those homeowners who have been bounced. In fact, those homeowners who ultimately fell out of the program benefited from the equivalent of a “free tax cut” while they were in the program because over that period, they were paying less on their mortgage than was otherwise required. And, officials say, this came without cost to the taxpayer.

That’s right. Even if it didn’t work out for you and we threw you out of the program like yesterday’s garbage (You still lose your home.), you got a “free tax cut.” That makes it all better.

Let’s be clear. There is no amount of evidence, no lack of effectiveness or intelligence, that the current administration does not believe cannot be washed away by good public relations.

I don’t get it. Why even bother to create this program? It’s about ten percent of what the banks got. So, already you knew immediately, average Americans are at best an afterthought.

I supposed it’s better to demonstrate over time you generally loath the American people, than to tell them immediately?

“Oh, you say,” James, “You’re overreacting, the President is constrained from helping these people. It’s the political system.”

No, it’s not. These people are the real victims of an orgy of speculation and they only thing they’ve been getting for two years, is a continuous, mile thick, wall of lectures on personal responsibility.

The President has within in his authority, dozens, hundreds of actions he could take to help these people out, and those things are not being done. At the very least, the mortgage industry could have been held to the simple legal procedures necessary for a proper foreclosure and this administration was not only unable to do that, they see no crisis now.

Where are out political choices?

James Pilant

Why Should We Have A Foreclosure Moratorium?

Ezra Klein from the Washington Post

Ezra Klein: (Klein has just asked why should we do a moratorium, this is his follow up question.) But won’t that just freeze the markets and throw everything into more chaos? And as for the homeowners, most of them will end up being foreclosed on anyway. We’ll have delayed the inevitable, adding uncertainty to economic pain.

John Taylor: (John Taylor is president and chief executive of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition.) Those are people who don’t understand what’s happening in the crisis. The point of a moratorium is to give the counselors and the attorneys time to negotiate a fairer, more responsible mortgage product. Mortgages where properties have been abandoned and the banks are repossessing them should go forward. But in other cases, where people have just lost jobs, we can be more patient. Citibank has given those people six months to get back on their feet. That’s what we need, not greasing the skids of this process. People need to understand, every time there’s a foreclosure, if you’re near that house, your property value goes down.

Taylor goes on to discuss the time a moratorium should last. I’ve been calling for three months. I’m a piker. Taylor calls for 6 to 8 months.

But he makes sense, a moratorium would encourage banks to renegotiate the loans, not just foreclose. We could do with a little reason, a little intelligence in this process. As I have pointed out before, giving people BMW sport utility vehicles for signing record numbers of foreclosure documents without looking at them is not just illegal, it’s crazy. It doesn’t make any sense to game the system like that. Rewarding people for good performance is not a bad idea. Rewarding people for lunacy, rewarding people for things that get your sanity questioned is not good management practice.

We could do mortgage foreclosures like people, not like process. We can live as decent human beings. We have choices. We can try to keep people in their homes. We can try to make the best of a bad situation. We don’t have to live this way.

James Pilant

Toxic Mortgages – Will The Banks Have To Buy Them Back?

If you read my last post, you may recall my emphasis on the word, putback. Strangely enough, it took about five minutes after I put that post up that the phrase once again became important.

Read this (from a CBS Moneywatch posting called, “The Foreclosure Mess: The Start of Another Bank Bailout?”

The foreclosure mess suddenly turned messier yesterday when a group of heavyweight investors, including the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, demanded that Bank of America buy back toxic mortgages that a subsidiary had sold them during the housing bubble. BlackRock, the world’s largest investment company, and Pimco, the world’s largest bond manager, joined the New York Fed in arguing that shoddy record keeping and other missteps by Bank of America subsidiary Countrywide Financial amount to a breach of their contract. Such a breach would allow the investors to sell the mortgages back to the bank at full price. The investors’ claims, which became public yesterday, probably marks the opening shot in a long legal battle that could cost B of A billions and possibly push it into insolvency.

Wow, the unfortunate entities (like pension funds) who bought these toxic assets have come back for a fight. They are saying that the numerous, continuous and often illegal acts (false affidavits presented to the court system – not a matter of opinion or just sloppy paperwork – crimes), have breached their contract. So, in the vernacular, the want their money back and they want it now! (That’s a putback by the way.)

Okay, let’s read a little more from the article –

That adds a new dimension to the foreclosure mess, which the banks had been hoping to put behind them. Banks and others had argued that maybe some i’s weren’t dotted and a few T’s might have misplaced crosses on mortgage documents, but those were just technicalities. The bottom line is that people didn’t pay their mortgages and foreclosures should be allowed to proceed. The Wall Street Journal editorial page recently declared: “We’re not aware of a single case so far of a substantive error.” But now some of the world’s savviest investors are joining defaulting homeowners in claiming that too many T’s are missing crosses. Unlike defaulting homeowners, most of whom will eventually lose their homes to foreclosure, the investors may succeed in winning concessions from the banks. And if the courts agree that Bank of America must make the investors whole, it could be more than the bank’s fragile finances could bear.

So, if the banks through their very own wretched incompetence lose ten of billions of dollars, they may turn to the taxpayers for a little more money!

Have you noticed a common thread that runs through every single story about these banking adventures? No one ever seems to go to jail. No one every seems to really get in any trouble at all, except of one group, a little bitty one.

The taxpayers always seem to be riding to the rescue of their fellow citizens, whoops, I mean the banks, whether they want to or not.

Tell me, does that get old after a while?

James Pilant

4 things buyers need to know about robo-signing and the foreclosure freeze (via Keyproperties’s Blog)

I really like the advice this web site gives. Its explanations are wonderfully clear. Some of you may be thinking of buying homes or have purchased a home that has been foreclosed on. You’ve got some questions and their answers seem to me intelligent and well phrased. So give them a look!

James Pilant

from Tara @Trulia.com NOTE: This post will be continually updated, below, as more foreclosure freeze news breaks. I double-dog dare you to watch a TV news show or spend more than 5 minutes on the web without hearing about the massive "robo-signing" foreclosure scandal that is rapidly encompassing the biggest banks in the country. Here are 4 things home buyers need to know about this breaking real estate news, and how it impacts them. (Hint: I thr … Read More

via Keyproperties's Blog

What I’m Beginning To Suspect About The Mortgage Fiasco?

At the moment, the mortgage crisis occupies a considerable amount of space on the web and the regular news, both popular and financial. I have been observing problems in the process for a long time.

The first thing that I observed was that banks were almost never re-negotiating their mortgages which struck me as extremely odd. Since the homes were priced during the housing bubble, the bank made much, much more money extending the loan then they did foreclosing, when they could only resell the house at its current market value.

The second thing was a constant drumbeat of stories where the banks were making foolish mistakes, foreclosing homes they didn’t own, or re-negotiating home mortgages and having done so, then foreclosing the house. Pretty strange stuff to see from well financed and lawyered up organizations.

As the crisis began to develop, I noticed that the high speed processing involved lying to judges perhaps several million times with false affidavits. I pointed out in postings that it would be hard to get lawyers to sign off on these things, Judges being the way they are. Then, of course, we found that they had hired every kind of person to sign off on these documents. Why would you want to do that?

I recognized that speed increased profits but you can get speed without incompetence. Considering the threat of later lawsuits and the chances of getting caught, we’re back to the question, “Why would you want to do that?”

One of the background issues that has been reported on a good number of times is that a high proportion of these mortgages were created at the height of Wall Street speculation in mortgage based securities. It was pointed out that in some of the reported cases, when challenged for the actual documents showing ownership, the banks have on occasion, been unable to do so.

Look guys, only a very small proportion of mortgages have been challenged in court. If you’re getting hits in those few cases (you’re finding properties without actual ownership documents), you are looking at the very tip top of the iceberg.

My suspicion is that the banks don’t have proof of ownership not in dozens, or hundreds or thousands of cases but in the tens of thousands. I am beginning to believe that all these bank assurances that the process would not have been any different if they had done their work is PR staving off inquiries as long as possible.

I believe the banks are desperate to get these matters settled before the deluge, to get as many foreclosures out of the way as possible so that when the eventual revelation occurs they can claim that the damage to the larger economy does not merit prosecution.

I suspect we are about to go into a second banking crisis similar to the one in 2008.

I hope I am just over suspicious and jaded.

If my scenario is accurate, we and the economy are in for a rough ride.

James Pilant

The Human Touch

The word, home, has powerful meanings for Americans. Who can forget, Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, saying over and over, “There’s no place like home.” How many of us “want to go home?” How many of us when overseas, look back at the U.S. and think about going “home.”

Home is a human concept life love, caring, kindness,.. those kinds of things.

It’s hard to quantify.

For most of American history, homes were very simple, often one room, generally little more than shacks. But as time went by and with urbanization, homes became larger and more complex … and more expensive.

For most Americans, purchasing a home all at once became impossible. A market for mortgages developed and people bought their homes over time.

Banks were small and deeply embedded into the fabric of the community. Social fabric is a fancy word for multiple relationships. A local bank with small resources depended heavily on the success of its loans, even the smallest, for its continued success. So, the bank exploited its connections, it knew a great deal about a creditor, may have known him personally, probably his family as well. They knew what he did for a living, not in the sense of the job title on the application, they knew what he did.

The bank was also well known. It’s officials were church goers, customers, friends, etc. The locals knew the bank by its continuously developing reputation.

Thus, there was social pressure both ways. For the homeowner, it was a disgrace to fall behind on payments. For the bank, it was dangerous to its moral authority to foreclose without consideration of many factors. Generally, speaking there was a great deal of pressure, rightfully so, to work out the problem rather than seize the home.

That’s gone. Beginning roughly in 1999, banks began selling their loans as assignments to investment banks to be bundled into “securities” to be sold to the foolish and the more foolish.

There is no knowledge of the community or the borrower beyond the thinnest veneer of computer data. The bank might as well be orbiting Pluto for all the effect of public opinion.

Human and business are both relegated to key strokes.

This limited knowledge is probably entirely adequate for “World for Warcraft.”

Taking a process developed from a community developed series of relationships has been disastrous. Banks were given the benefit of the doubt because as community citizens they could be trusted. This made the process of mortgage foreclosure easier for the banks, streamlining a difficult problem in the community to be as painless as possible.

Maintaining that level of trust in bank integrity has been disastrous in an age where banking has become more a world of bonus obsessed, financial buccaneers than respectable community bankers.

The human recipients of the mortgages have suffered terribly. They have very often expected that their loans could be modified as since they were making what in the past were reasonable offers only to be tossed from “the gates of the temple.” What was reasonable no longer mattered. What was the best decision no longer mattered.

The only thing that mattered was the process. Humans need not apply.

We can no longer pretend that banks are reasonable, that they will act intelligently, or that they have the interest of the community or their nation in mind, when they make decisions.

James Pilant

Foreclosure Speed Made Loan Modifications Impossible

Why would a bank modify a loan rather than foreclosing? Loan modification is usually more profitable.

Let me explain. Take a typical home mortgage that has run into trouble. The purchaser owns a home that he bought at a price of 350,000 dollars in early 2006. He has fallen behind on the mortgage. He can pay each month but not as much as the mortgage is worth. However and it is a big however, the real estate boom has collapsed. The home valued now is worth only 270,000 dollars. His mortgage payments, his salary and the other facts point to him being able to pay a mortgage of that size. So, the bank would accept a loss on the mortgage reducing it to 270,000 in value. The bank now has a workable agreement with the homeowner. He can now pay on the loan regularly.

There is a 80,000 dollar loss for the bank. That would be a big deal if the bank had any way of getting it. If they foreclose on the house, they will be attempting to resell quickly a home now valued at 270k, and at the additional expense of the time and money of the foreclosure process. That 80,000 is not recoverable. Why not renegotiate a lower mortgage with the current owner who is already making payments?

This key questions here are, “How much is this property worth?” and “Can I get as much by foreclosure as I can by modifying the mortgage?”

Everyone watching the process of foreclosures over the last few years has been struck by one fact – there have been very few loan modifications. Almost every homeowner was foreclosed on. It did not seem to matter whether a modification was profitable or not.

As a society, we had never seen that before. People had been foreclosed on before in every kind of economic crisis. But in all these situations if the banks profited more by modifying the mortgage, the mortgage got modified. Now, it doesn’t matter if the bank profits from a loan modification or not. It’s easier and quicker to foreclose.

Also, it was easier to measure success by foreclosure rather than by re-negotiations. You could count the scalps on the wall. Negotiations that resulted in greater profits over longer periods of time didn’t count well.

The system is tilted against homeowners. The speed and number of foreclosures made it impossible for lenders to renegotiate.

From the Washington Post

The financial incentives show that the problems plaguing the foreclosure process extend well beyond a few, low-ranking document processors who forged documents or failed to review foreclosure files even as they signed off on them. In fact, virtually everyone involved – loan servicers, law firms, document processing companies and others – made more money as they evicted more borrowers from their homes, creating a system that was vulnerable to error and difficult for homeowners to challenge.

“This was a systemic problem. It’s not like a few renegade employees made mistakes,” said lawyer Peter Ticktin, who defends Florida homeowners facing foreclosure. “It was industry-wide and pervasive, and everyone knew about it.”

The need for speed neutralized any attempt at judgment. No human intelligence could be allowed to interfere with number and speed, a total victory of the abstract over the concrete and real. Loan modifications are better for long term profits but they are not fast.

Understand this. In any long term profit making analysis, you have to apply human judgment, and from that you can maximise profit. The foreclosure system we have now does only one thing well – foreclose quickly. Everything else is does badly.

James Pilant